We study the effect of increases in effective minimum wages on the prices of several fast-food items using quarterly city-level data from 1993-2014, a period during much of which the federal minimum wage declined in real value while state-level legislation flourished. For one product, a burger, we find a robust price elasticity of 9% with respect to the minimum wage. This estimate indicates substantial cost pass-through when contextualized by the effect of minimumwage increases on restaurant wage bills. Our estimate for pizza is suggestive of a similarly large pass-through rate but is less precisely estimated, and our estimate for fried chicken is near zero, but estimated even less precisely. Taken as a whole, our estimates point toward sizable cost pass-through of minimum wage increases to consumer prices. These results contribute to a mixed literature on the consumer burden of minimum wage increases.
Introduction

A panel appointed by New York governor Andrew Cuomo recently recommended that New
York increase the minimum wage paid to fast-food workers who work for chains with at least 30 locations, to $15 an hour (McGeehan, 2015) . Other cities, including Seattle and Los Angeles, have already implemented similar increases. Although there is an extensive literature on the effects of minimum-wage increases on low-skilled workers' wages and employment rates, relatively little attention has been paid to estimating the pass-through of these increases to consumer prices (Neumark and Wascher, 2008; Lemos, 2008) . The elasticity of prices with respect to the minimum wage matters because it has distributional implications and represents a potential channel for inflationary effects of labor policy.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of minimum-wage increases on prices of three fastfood products -burgers, fried chicken, and pizza -using data from the last twenty years, which include significant variation in minimum wages both over time and across locations.
We find large point estimates for the first two products: elasticity estimates of 0.09 and 0.08, respectively, both of which imply large cost pass-through. The estimate of the elasticity of the burger price is fairly precise, with a standard error of about 0.03, while the estimate for pizza is much noisier. For the third product, fried chicken, our standard errors are also quite large, and although our point estimate is small and negative, the confidence interval does not rule out a large pass-through effect. We also estimate the price effects of the minimum wage using two other datasets, the food-away-from-home CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the average price of a meal from the Census of Accommodation and Foodservices, and find similar results.
Earlier papers that address this question include Aaronson (2001) , Card and Krueger (1994) , and Katz and Krueger (1992) . Aaronson (2001) , which is most similar to our paper, uses data from 1978-1995 and finds an elasticity of fast-food prices with respect to the minimum wage ranging from 0.07 to 0.16. Katz and Krueger's (1992) point estimates are not statistically significant, leading them to conclude that prices are unaffected by the minimum wage, but their standard errors are large and their point estimates do not rule out large effects. Card and Krueger (1994) report that their results are "mixed" because in some specifications their coefficients are not statistically significant; but again, in these cases their standard errors are quite large and do not rule out substantial cost pass-through. In a related paper, Aaronson, French, and MacDonald (2008) focus on the price effects of the federal minimum-wage increases in 1996-97 and find price elasticities around 0.07. MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) find that pass-through in aggregate prices is quite fast, although individual establishments may not adjust all prices immediately. Finally, in a case study of the early effect of San Francisco's "living wage" legislation, Dube, Naidu, and Reich (2007) find a price elasticity of about 0.06 for fast-food outlets.
In the years since those papers were written there was substantial erosion in the federal minimum wage and significant activity at the state level. The federal minimum wage fell more than 25% in real terms between September 1997 and July 2007. In response, many states increased their minimum wages, providing rich variation for estimating price effects using a full difference-in-difference framework, unlike earlier studies, which are limited by relatively few state-level changes in minimum-wage legislation.
As a result, compared to earlier studies, our dataset is significantly more comprehensive, including five federal minimum-wage increases and over 300 state or local increases. This allows us to estimate flexible difference-in-difference specifications that control for many unobserved factors other studies have had to assume away. This is an advantage in particular over the dataset used by Aaronson (2001) , in which identification relies primarily on increases in the federal minimum wage.
To determine the degree of pass-through, we also estimate the effect of the minimum wage on restaurant wage bills. We find that the elasticity of the state-level wage bill of limited-service restaurants with respect to the minimum wage is around 0.16. A back-of-theenvelope calculation suggests that, if the labor share of marginal cost is about 50%, fast-food restaurants are fully passing through their cost increases to consumer prices.
Data
We obtained minimum-wage data from several sources. Federal minimum-wage rates and enactment dates come from the U.S. Department of Labor's website, which also includes historical state minimum-wage data but without the enactment dates. We corroborated the data with history of state minimum-wage enactment dates from Fiscal Policy Institute (2006) for 1996-2006 as well as from state governments' websites for the remaining years to form a comprehensive dataset with state minimum-wage rates and their enactment dates from 1993-2014. The minimum-wage data are described in detail in Appendix A.1.
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We use city-level average-price data for the period 1993-2014 from the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER, formerly the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association, or ACCRA). The data are updated quarterly, in the first week of each quarter (in January, April, July, and October). For this analysis, we use C2ER's city-level average prices of three fast-food items over the period . These data are also used in Aaronson's (2001) 1 The minimum wage does not apply to all workers. In many states tipped workers' cash wages may fall below the state's regular minimum wage, as long as the sum of cash wages and tips meets the minimum-wage standard. However, tipping is very unusual in the fast-food sector, and we believe our minimum-wage data appropriately capture the relevant wage floor (Even and Macpherson, 2014; Allegretto, 2013) . Jones (2015) provides evidence on the effect of the tipped minimum wage on the wages of restaurant servers.
2 City-level C2ER data have been used for a variety of economic studies in the past, including studies of supermarket financing (Chevalier, 1995; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996) ; price convergence and deviations from the "law of one price" (Parsley and Wei, 1996; Choi and Wu, 2012) ; inequality (Frankel and Gould, 2001) ; and the impact of retailer entry on prices (Basker, 2005; Courtemanche and Carden, 2014) . Aaronson (2001) raises several concerns about the ACCRA/C2ER data. First, he notes that C2ER does not aim for consistency in its product definitions over time, focusing instead on cross-sectional consistency; as a result, survey participants vary from quarter to quarter.
While the product definitions of the fast-food items in this study have not changed over this period, the specific outlets surveyed may have changed, which could result in spurious variation over time in the average price of a specific item in a given city. Second, the quarterly frequency of C2ER data makes it difficult to determine whether prices respond immediately to a minimum-wage increase. Because C2ER prices are always collected in the first week of the quarter, and minimum-wage increase almost always become effective on the first day of the quarter, a lag in price adjustment of just a few days delays our observation of the price increase by a full quarter. Aaronson (2001) partially addresses the first concern by smoothing out the price series to remove temporary price changes of more than 5% that quickly return to their prior levels. We have estimated all our regressions using this smoothing procedure, but as it did not meaningfully change either point estimates or significance levels, we report only the unadjusted regressions.
Like Aaronson (2001) , we supplement the price analysis by using the BLS "food-awayfrom-home" CPI as a second measure of prices, this one at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. Because many of the BLS cities are actually multi-state metro areas (e.g., Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV; New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA), and are subject to different minimum wages in different parts of the metro area at any given point in time, we conduct the CPI analysis using two different samples. years. The year-to-year growth rate of per-capita GSP averages 1.5% over this sample; eight states experienced growth above 9% at some point during the sample and five experienced a decline greater than 9% at some point. 
Effect of Minimum Wage on Fast-Food Prices
For each of the three fast-food items, we estimate
where price it is the price in city i at the beginning of quarter t; α i is a city fixed effect, δ t is a time (quarter×year) fixed effect, β i is a city-specific linear trend, and minwage is is the minimum wage in city i at the beginning of quarter s. We start with a specification that includes only the current minimum wage, S = {t}, and then add the one-quarter lag and lead of the minimum wage as control variables so that S = {t − 3, t, t + 3}. 6 Because we include time fixed effects, we do not control for spatially invariant factors such as the overall CPI or the CPI for specific inputs, such as beef or chicken, as in Aaronson (2001). Table 1 presents the coefficients γ s from the above regression. 7 We cluster the standard errors at the state level because, although we have city-level observations, almost all of the variation in the minimum wage occurs at the state level.
We find that McDonald's burger prices increase by about 0.9% for every 10% increase in the effective minimum wage; this coefficient is significant at the 1% level. We also estimate an increase, of about 0.8% for a 10% increase in the effective minimum wage, for the price of pizza, but this effect is not significant at conventional levels. In the case of KFC fried chicken prices, the point estimate is negative, but the standard error is very large and does not preclude positive as well as negative and zero price effects. In an unreported regression 6 An earlier version of this paper included GSP in the price regressions. We omit this variable in the price regressions in the current version of the paper because it is available only to 2013 (and the 2013 values are preliminary) whereas prices are available to 2014. Robustness checks with available data using log GSP as a control variable are extremely similar to the reported regressions in the current version.
7 We drop cities with fewer than 40 observations from our sample because we worry that dramatic changes in the sample from quarter to quarter could move not only the average price (which we control for with a quarter fixed effect) but also the variance of prices, which affects efficiency. However, the results are not sensitive to this sample selection; for example, the coefficient on minimum wage in the burger-price regression is 0.086, as compared with 0.093 in the restricted sample. Statistical significance is unaffected. Results from the full set of cities are available upon request.
we have estimated a single effect for all three products, including both city-level trends and a full set of product×time fixed effects, and find a coefficient of about 0.05 but a standard error of about 0.03.
When we add the one-quarter lead and lag of the minimum wage, we find that the increase in McDonald's prices is very concentrated in the quarter of the minimum-wage increase, as is the effect of the minimum wage on pizza prices. The KFC regression does show a (very small) positive correlation between the current minimum wage and the current price, but it is flanked by two negative coefficients in the leading and lagged quarters.
We have extended the leads and lags by one more quarter in supplementary regressions, not shown. These estimates are noisier, but all produce positive contemporaneous-effect coefficients, with point estimates ranging from 0.02 (fried chicken) to 0.09 (burger).
These estimates are broadly consistent with the results of Aaronson's (2001) analysis, in which he regressed log prices on the current minimum wage, a one-month lead, and a one-month lag, using year and quarter fixed effects rather than a full set of time effects (interactions of year and quarter), over an earlier period, and with a significantly smaller dataset (roughly 3,000 observations compared to about 20,000 here).
Burger prices are for a single chain, McDonald's, but pizza and fried chicken are a weighted average across two chains, possibly with the weights changing over time in way that we cannot observe but may be correlated with the error term. We do not have information on the identity of the stores surveyed in each city, nor do we have historical data on the locations of the various chains. Instead, we use the February 2014 U.S. locations of both Pizza Inn and Church's Chicken, the two smaller chains, from the companies' websites. Of the 185 Pizza Inn locations in the U.S. in February 2014, 22 were in cities included in the C2ER sample. Removing those 22 cities from the sample had no meaningful effect on the estimated effect of the minimum wage on the price of pizza; the significance level was also unaffected. Church's is a bigger chain, and we had to eliminate 114 of the cities in our sample to eliminate any overlap with Church's locations. When we estimate the chicken-price regression excluding cities in which Church's may have been surveyed, the coefficient on the minimum wage increases from −0.03 to +0.03, but it remains imprecisely estimated.
We conclude that the confounding of multiple chains is not driving the pizza-price results, but may have contributed to the negative estimate in the chicken-price regressions.
To test whether our results are spurious, we run a placebo exercise in which we assign states' minimum-wage histories randomly, with replacement, following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) . In each of 1,000 simulations, we put probability 1 /50 on each of the 50 states, and use the selected state's entire vector of minimum-wage history, then re-estimate Equation (1). Using the price of a burger on the LHS, the mean of the 1,000 coefficient estimates we obtain is 0.0005, or nearly zero; the range of estimates we obtain in these simulations is −0.1177 to 0.0901: all fall below 0.0932, the point estimate from Equation (1).
A kernel density of these placebo estimates is shown in Figure 1(a) . A solid vertical line represents zero; dashed vertical lines are also shown at the 5th percentile, the mean, and the 95th percentile of the distribution; and a bold vertical line is shown at 0.0932. We conclude that the clustered OLS standard errors are not under-estimated, and that the effect we estimate is not spurious. Figure 1(b) shows the distribution of the placebo coefficients for pizza; the point estimate from the OLS regression, 0.0780, exceeds the 95th percentile of the distribution of placebo coefficients and is in that sense significant at the 10% level.
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As another robustness check, we also estimated the model using the BLS "food-awayfrom-home" CPI. As noted earlier, we have monthly data for part or all of the sample period from only ten MSAs in eight states that are contained entirely within a single state, and for 8 The point estimate of the fried-chicken effect is below the mean of the falsification-exercise distribution; to save space we do not include it here. In unreported robustness checks, we have also removed the cityspecific trends; the estimated pass-through of the minimum wage to pizza decreases in this specification, from a statistically insignificant 0.08 to a statistically insignificant 0.02; the estimated effect for burger prices increases, from 0.09 to 0.11, and remains significant at the 1% level. We have also attempted to control for time-varying city-level conditions by including the city's unemployment rate, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. City-level monthly unemployment rates are available for 280 of the 311 cities in our sample. These results are qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical to the estimates without the additional control. 
where fraction it is the fraction of restaurant revenues earned by restaurants whose prices fall below $5, $10, or $15, respectively. These results are shown in Table 3 . Given the small number of observations per state, the power of this regression is limited, but the results are consistent with our earlier findings. The one statistically significant coefficient (significant at the 5% level) shows that a 10% increase in the minimum wage decreases the share of restaurant sales at restaurants charging less than $10 per meal by about 1%.
Pass-through
We assume that marginal cost is composed of two separable components: a labor cost per unit of output, which depends on the minimum wage, and a cost of supplies (beef, lettuce, etc.), which is independent of the minimum wage. To calculate pass-through, we must first determine the relative importance of these two separate components of marginal cost, and then determine how much the labor portion increases with the minimum wage.
There are no definitive estimates of the labor share of marginal cost, so we approximate these with the labor share of average costs. According to the 2002 Census of Business Expenses (CBE), of a total of nearly $93 billion in operating expenses for limited-service restaurants (NAICS 7222), payroll accounted for 41.8% and employer costs for fringe benefits accounted for another 5.9%, totaling 47.7%.
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For the second task, we use annual data from the CBP, which includes, at the state level, annual and first-quarter payroll figures for various restaurant subsectors. We estimate
where pay it is either real annual or real first-quarter payroll in state i in year t, and δ t is a year fixed effect. The minimum wage in year t is calculated as the algebraic average of the 12 monthly minimum wages in the state; and the first-quarter minimum wage is calculated as the algebraic average of the three monthly minimum wages in the first quarter.
We estimate this regression separately for all restaurants and drinking places, full-service restaurants, and limited-service restaurants. We have data on the first starting in 1993, but the breakdown by service level is only available starting in 1998. The results are reported in Table 4 . Our preferred specification uses first-quarter data since the minimum wage is measured with less error in that specification (minimum-wage increases rarely occur within a quarter). We find that total state-wide restaurant payroll increases by 1.4% for every 10% increase in the average state effective minimum wage.
When we break down the payroll effect by type of restaurant, it is clear that the effect on full-service restaurants is somewhat smaller -close to 1.1% -than the effect on limitedservice restaurants, which is 1.6%.
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Putting these all together, we can perform the following back-of-the-envelope calculation:
If payroll costs at limited-service restaurants increase by 1.6% for a 10% increase in the minimum wage, and marginal cost consists of approximately 50% labor cost, then marginal cost increases by 0.8% for every 10% increase in the minimum wage. Our finding that prices increase by approximately that much implies, then, a full pass-through of minimum wages to consumer prices.
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One concern about the above calculation is that minimum-wage increases may cause hiring managers to change employment levels, thereby changing the labor share of marginal costs endogenously. To assess the possible magnitude of this effect we have also estimated Equation (3) replacing log payroll with log restaurant employment on the LHS, again from CBP figures. The estimated elasticity of aggregate restaurant employment with respect to the minimum wage is negative, ranging from −0.03 to −0.05, but statistically insignificant.
This is consistent with a competitive-labor-market model in which labor demand is very
11 The coefficients on current and lagged gross state product (not shown) are all positive and statistically significant. The elasticity of restaurant payroll with respect to current GSP ranges from 0.27-0.29, depending on the specification, and is significant at least at the 5% level in all specifications. The elasticity of restaurant payroll with respect to lagged GSP ranges from 0.31-0.39 and is significant at the 1% level except in all specifications.
12 If minimum-wage increases affect the labor costs of workers further up the supply chain -in the harvesting, warehousing, distributing of the raw food, for example -and are passed through in the cost of raw materials for food production, then our calculation overstates the pass-through of the minimum wage in the fast-food sector.
inelastic. Although we cannot extrapolate to the effect of large changes in the minimum wage, within the range of the increases in the 20-year period covered by this study, the effect on employment is very small.
Concluding Remarks
We find robust, economically meaningful, and statistically significant effects of changes in the effective minimum wage on the price of a burger; a slightly smaller and marginally significant estimate of the effect on the price of pizza; and a very imprecise estimate of the effect on the price of fried chicken. In making inferences from these estimates, we place the most weight on the most precise estimate, an elasticity of 9%.
Our findings imply a full pass-through of that higher costs of production to consumers in the form of higher prices. Even so, from a consumer's standpoint, the price increases are small. Our estimates imply that a 33% increase in the federal minimum wage, from $7.25/hour to $10.10/hour, as has been proposed, could increase prices of fast-food and similarly unskilled-labor intensive goods by 3% in the 27 states for which the federal minimum wage is the effective minimum wage (as of December 2014), and by a lesser but still positive amount in the remaining 23 states.
Even with full pass-through, the income effect of this price increase is likely to be very small. The average price of a burger in 2014, according to the C2ER data used in this paper, was approximately $3.77. A 3% increase in this price amounts to only about 10 cents.
13 At the extreme, consider a minimum-wage earner who eats a McDonald's burger every single day. If the minimum wage increases $7.25/hour to $10.10/hour, her monthly expenditure 13 The predictive power of our estimates is strongest in the range over which we identify these estimates. The real minimum wage, in December 2014 dollars, ranges in our sample from $5.80 to $9.51, with the interquartile range roughly between $6.70 and $7.70. If the minimum wage were to increase dramatically, to $15 per hour, as some have suggested, we expect its effect on all outcome variables to be magnified, but we cannot accurately predict the magnitude of the effect. on burgers will increase by about $3 per month, an increase that is nearly fully offset by the increase in just one hour's earnings.
Moreover, the elasticity we estimate for these products is an upper bound on the overall price impact of the minimum wage. Fast-food products are most likely to be affected by minimum-wage increases because the fast-food sector is low-skilled intensive and many workers in this sector earn the minimum wage. The restaurant sector employs by far the largest percentage of minimum-wage workers; MaCurdy (2015) estimates, using data from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation, that nearly 21% of minimum-wage jobs and 18% of minimum-wage hours are in the restaurant sector. Within the restaurant sector, low-skilled and low-wage workers are disproportionately employed in the fast-food sector. In 2011, there were more than 200,000 limited-service restaurants in the U.S., accounting for 37% of all restaurants and bars and for more than 35% of the sector's employees, but only 30% of its combined payroll.
The full distributional impact of this finding is indeterminate, because it depends on expenditure shares of different types of earners in sectors differentially reliant on minimumwage earners.
14 However, our calculations imply that even a full pass-through of minimum wages to prices is unlikely to lead to large upward price pressure. Although consumers are affected by minimum-wage increases, these effects are small relative to the direct wage effects.
14 For example, expenditure on food eaten away from home increases with income, but low-income households may spend disproportionately on fast food. We are not aware of any data set that tracks both consumer demographics and expenditure on food consumed away from home by type of restaurant. The Consumer Expenditure Survey combines expenditures at table-service restaurants, fast-food restaurants, cafes and bars into one question.
A Data
A.1 Minimum Wages
The federal minimum-wage increased five times during the period of our study: October 1, 1996 (from $4.25 to $4.75 per hour); September 1, 1997 (to $5.15); July 24, 2007 (to $5.85);
July 24, 2008 (to $6.55); and July 24, 2009 (to $7.25) . Figure A-1 shows the real federal minimum wage, in December 2014 dollars, over the period of our study; real (CPI-deflated) buying power of the minimum wage decreased by more than 25% between September 1997 and July 2007, before rising, in steps, to a level higher than that of September 1997. Sandwiched between the federal minimum-wage increases are many instances of state minimum-wage changes. In our analysis, the only minimum-wage changes of economic interest are those where the effective minimum wage in a state changes as a result of either a federal or a state minimum-wage hike. A federal minimum-wage hike can change the effective minimum wage in a state if (a) the state effective minimum wage is set at the old federal level, in which case it receives the full brunt of the new federal minimum-wage hike; (b) the state's effective minimum wage is between the old and the new federal levels, in which case the effective wage floor increases by less than the full amount of the federal increase; (c) the state's effective minimum wage is at or above the new federal level, but state law pegs the state minimum wage at a fixed level above the federal wage.
15 States whose effective minimum wages are at or above the new federal level and have no mandated contemporaneous increase see no minimum-wage spikes following an increase in the federal wage floor. The effective minimum wage in a state also increases when the state raises its minimum-wage level above the federal minimum-wage rate by passing a law to that effect in the state legislature, or when, due to CPI pegging, the minimum wage increases automatically on an annual basis. Since there was no federal minimum-wage hike between 1997 and 2007, some states experienced several minimum-wage changes during this period while others had no minimum-wage increases. We use this periodic variability, along with the additional variation provided by the uneven impact of the federal hikes in 1996, 1997, and the late 2000s, to identify the effects of minimum-wage changes on prices and isolate them from the effects of other variables changing at the same time. Table A -2 lists the number of effective minimum-wage increases by state over the period of our study. A total of 321 instances are listed, two thirds of which are either due to federal minimum-wage increases or take effect within six months (three months before to three months after) of a federal increase. One hundred and one increases in 29 states are completely independent of the federal increases and occur outside the six-month window. stopped collecting fourth-quarter prices, so we have price data for a maximum of 74 quarters for each product and city. We do not know which, or even how many, outlets were surveyed in practice in each city.
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Some cities in the C2ER database are actually composites of several nearby cities (for (2000), Church's Chicken had, at the time, 593 company-owned outlets and 604 franchised outlets; by contrast, KFC had 3,192 company-owned outlets and 6,239 franchised outlets. For this reason we refer to their product as "KFC chicken" although both chains are represented in the data. Pizza Inn is listed as having three company-owned outlets and 500 franchised outlets. Pizza Hut is not listed in Info Franchise News, Inc. (2000), but Yum! Brands' annual report for 2000 lists 7,927 U.S. outlets. Again, we recognize that establishments from both chains are polled, but suspect the sample is heavily biased towards Pizza Hut.
18 In cities with fewer than five establishments in a given category, all relevant establishments are to be surveyed. In cities with no precise matches (e.g., no McDonald's outlets), the survey includes the price of the item at an establishment most closely matching the described item (if one exists); for example, the instructions say, "If your area doesn't have even one McDonald's restaurant, report the average price at 'fast food' restaurants for a hamburger sandwich with a -pound (before cooking) all-beef patty, cheese, pickle, onion, mustard, and ketchup" (ACCRA 2003, p. 2.21) .
19 The inter-quartile range of the price of pizza converges to a point in the third quarter of 2010, when just over half the cities -152 of 303 -quoted a price of $10 for a pizza. This is highly unusual, and appears to be motivated by a chain-wide sale, although we could not find any documentation for it. 1993-2012 1993-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 Observations  1000  1000  750  750  748 748 Unit of observation is a state-year All regressions include state and time FE, state-specific linear trends, and current and lagged gross state product Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state * p<10%; ** p<5%; *** p<1% 
